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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
(
 STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
VICKIE BURROW, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
MARK VRONTIKIS, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 88-0098CA 
-000O000-
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On the 5th day of January, 1988, Judge J. Dennis Frederick, District Court 
Judge for the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah entered an Order that the Plaintiff's claim for support for the minor child 
prior to the date of the filing of Plaintiffs paternity action was barred by the 
doctrine of laches and/or equitable estoppel. 
Plaintiff /Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal from said Order and the 
jurisdiction is properly before this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S78-2a-
3(2)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. May the Appellants now object to the Court's reliance upon the Utah 
Supreme Court case of Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987) with 
respect to the instant case. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. Is there a factual basis for the trial court's determination that the 
doctrines of laches and/or equitable estoppel apply in the instant action. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. ORDINANCES. 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
78-45a-l. Obligations of the father. 
The father of a child which is or may be born out of 
wedlock is liable to the same extent as the father of a 
child born in wedlock, whether or not the child is born 
alive, for the reasonable expense of the mother 's 
pregnancy and confinement and for the education, 
necessary support and funeral expenses of the child. A 
child bom out of wedlock includes a child born to a 
married woman by a man other than her husband 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed an act ion in pa terni ty based upon Utah Code Ann. 
S78-45a-l £JL seq. Defendant admit ted paterni ty but argued that any 
payments for support prior to the filing of the Complaint in the instant case were 
barred by the equitable doctrines of laches and/or estoppel. At the time of trial, 
the Court entered an Order for ongoing support for the Plaintiff and provided for 
back support distinguishing between that period prior to the filing of the action 
and that period from the filing of the action to the date of trial. The Court ruled 
that although the Plaintiff had engaged in conduct which may have met the 
definit ions of laches a n d / o r es toppel that it was barred by the then 
present case law from consider ing the effect of such conduct . A 
$7,200.00 judgment thus arose in favor of the Plaintiff and against the 
Defendant for support prior to the filing of the paternity action. 
The Defendant appealed arguing that the case of Zito v. Butler, 584 P.2d 
868 (Utah 1978) was bad law to the extent that it denied the application of the 
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equitable doctrines of laches and estoppels in statutory case. After briefing and 
prior to argument, the Utah Supreme Court decided the case of Borland v. 
Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987) specifically confirming the position asserted 
by the Defendant. On the basis of the Borland case, this Court reversed the 
previous judgment and remanded the matter to the Third Judicial District Court 
for reconsideration of the issues of equitable estoppel and laches. 
Upon remand, the District Court held an evidentiary hearing at which both 
Plaintiff and Defendant testified and testimony was taken from a mutual friend 
who had interacted with both of the parties during that period. Based upon the 
testimony received at the hearing, the Trial Court determined that the Plaintiff's 
claim for support prior to the filing of the paternity action was barred by the 
doctrines of laches and/or equitable estoppel. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law attached hereto). From that Order Plaintiffs have appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and Defendant dated as high school students in the early part of 
1976. While neither party considered the relationship "serious" it resulted in the 
unanticipated and unwelcome pregnancy of the Plaintiff. (TR. 3) * 
Plaintiff and Defendant met to discuss the dilemma. That meeting was 
unsatisfactory from the point of view of the Plaintiff causing her to feel "rejected" 
and "hurt". (TR. 7) No agreement was reached between the parties at that time 
and there was no further direct contact between Plaintiff and Defendant until 
1. All references in the Statement of Facts are to the reporters transcript of proceeding conducted 
before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick on Monday, December 7, 1987. 
i 
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some seven years later when the Plaintiff filed the instant action. (TR. 4, 7) 
Plaintiff determined that she would have the child and raise the child 
herself independent of any interaction or role on the part of the Defendant. (TR. 
7,8) 
The parties had a mutual friend by the name of William Snape who testified 
at the hearing. The Plaintiff indicated to Mr. Snape that after her meeting with 
Mr. Vrontikis, she under no uncertain terms wanted anything to do with Vrontikis; 
did not want to see him again; and wanted to handle the matter herself. (TR. 31) 
The Plaintiff knew that Mr. Snape was in contact with Mr. Vrontikis and Mr. 
Snape believed that she anticipated and desired that he pass that information to 
Mr. Vrontikis so that Mr. Vrontikis would leave her alone. (TR. 32) Mr. Snape 
communicated this information to Mr, Vrontikis who complied. 
Mr. Vrontikis, having received this information, respected her desires and 
went on with planning his life not participating in the raising of this child, 
marrying, raising a family of his own and making financial commitments. (TR. 23, 
24, 25) This continued for seven years until the Plaintiff decided she needed 
financial assistance and commenced the instant action claiming not only future 
support, but reimbursement for past support. (TR. 14, 15, 16) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The effect of the Utah Supreme Court decision in Borland, supra is to 
allow the equitable doctrines of laches and estoppel to be applied with equal force 
and effect in paternity actions as in other domestic cases. 
2. The Trial Court properly found that the Plaintiffs claim for back support 
was barred by the equitable doctrines of laches and/or estoppel. The Trial Court 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
findings that the Plaintiff desired that there be no contact between her and the 
Defendant following the birth of the child, that she would raise the child 
independent of any role on the part of the Defendant including his assistance, that 
she expressed this desire to a third party who she knew to be in communications 
with the Defendant. And that she knew or should have known that her statements 
would be communicated to the Defendant. That he reasonably relied upon those 
statements are sufficient for application of laches and estoppel. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
EQUITABLE ARGUMENTS ARE AVAILABLE DEFENSES IN 
PATERNITY ACTIONS. 
Appellant argues in her second point that this Court should limit the effect 
of Borland v. Chandler, supra, overruling the earlier incorrect doctrine of Zito 
v. Butler, supra, only to the extent that a Defendant has been prejudiced at trial. 
Clearly, Borland stands for the principle of equal application of equitable 
doctrine, including the full effect of laches and estoppel in paternity actions, just 
as previously available in other domestic matter: 
The principle relied upon by the Plaintiffs has its roots 
in the common law distinction between law and equity. 
At common law, an equitable defense could not be 
raised to a legal action, and because a statutory action 
was legal in nature, equitable defenses would not apply. 
See Am. Jur. 2d equity 8154 (1966). This seems to be 
the theory behind Zito, a per curiam opinion. 
However, Utah long ago abolished any formal 
distinction between law and equity. See Utah R.Civ. 
P.2. It is well established that equitable defenses may 
be applied in actions at law and that principles of 
equity apply wherever necessary to prevent injustice. 
(Citations omitted). Therefore, it is clear that under 
c 
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appropriate circumstances, laches may bar an action 
for paternity. Even the majority opinion in Nielsen ex 
rel. Department of Social Services v. Hansen. 564 
P.2d 1113, 1114 (Utah 1977), cited by Zito recognizes 
in dictum that laches might apply in a paternity action. 
Therefore, we conclude that to the extent that Zito 
stands for the proposition that an equitable defense is 
not available, it is an incorrect statement of law and is 
over-ruled. ( footnote omi t t ed) . Borland v. 
Chandler, 733 P.2d. Id. at 146. 
Thus, the argument advanced by Appellants herein is inconsistent with the 
clear intent of the Court. The principles of Zito were incorrect at the time the 
per curiam decision was announced. It was only a matter of time until the Court 
corrected the problem and restated the basic principle of law. Equitable defenses 
are available and may be raised by Defendants in all actions where they apply 
whether the action arises at common law or as a creature of statute. 
Additionally, Appellant should be barred from challenging the effect of 
Borland in this case, at this time, in that this Court has already relied upon the 
decision in Borland v. Chandler to reverse and remand for consideration of the 
defenses of laches and estoppel which set the stage for the Trial Court ruling with 
which Appellant now takes issue. Plaintiff/Appellant took no exception to this 
Courts ruling at that time and is now bound by that position. The Trial Court 
properly followed the mandate of this Court and considered equitable defenses in 
this action. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHIN ITS DISCRETION TO 
FIND A FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE 
DOCTRINES OF LACHES AND/OR ESTOPPEL. 
Appellants primary point is not founded in law but rather disputes the 
Findings of Fact issued by the Trial Court. It is a well settled standard of 
a 
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appellate review that the trial court 's determination of facts is entitled to 
considerable deference and should be disturbed only when necessary to prevent 
manifest injustice. Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 140 (Utah 1980). The 
standard for review is that the Court should not disturb the Findings of Fact made 
below unless they appear to be clearly erroneous or against the weight of the 
evidence. Dang v. Cox Corporation, 655 P.2d 658, 660 (Utah, 1982); McBride 
v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978). See also State v. Gabaldon, 735 
P.2d 410 (Utah App. 1987); Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1035 (Utah App. 1987). 
There is a distinction between current and future support due a child and a 
. parents claim for reimbursement for past support provided. Baggs v. Anderson, 
528 P.2d 141 (1974). Thus th claim for reimbursement of support is open to 
challenge based upon the conduct of the party making the claim. Larsen v. 
Larsen, 300 P.2d 596 (1956). These claims may be raised in equity and turn on 
the facts as decided by the fact finder. Borland v. Chandler, supifl. 
Defendant raised two defenses in equity, laches and estoppel. While these 
are similar and are often confused, the elements are somewhat different. 
Utah Supreme Court discussed the differences and the elements for each in 
Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262 (1980) as follows: 
The availability of the defense of laches in contingent 
upon th establishment of two elements: (1) the lack of 
diligence on the part of the Plaintiff; and (2) an injury to 
Defendant owing to such lack of diligence (footnote 
omitted). 
The doctrine of estoppel has application when one, by 
his acts, representations, or conduct or by his silence 
when he ought to speak, induces another to believe 
certain facts exist and such other relies thereon to his 
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detriment, (footnote omitted) id. at 1264. 
The Trial Court found from the evidence that these doctrines were 
applicable in the instant case. 
A. Laches. 
The Plaintiff in the instant matter had a potential remedy at law available 
for financial assistance from the father of her child. That cause of action would 
allow for determination of paternity and establishment of a obligation for support 
at a sum certain. Utah Code Ann. S78-45a-l et, sec .^ The Plaintiff decided not to 
pursue that cause of action and not to attempt to avail herself of that potential 
remedy for a period of seven years. This clearly constitutes a lack of diligence but 
is further aggravated in this case because it was motivated by a willingness to 
forgo the potential benefit in order to avoid what would come with that benefit, 
i.e. the involvement of the father in the life of his child and accordingly in the life 
of the Plaintiff and the Defendant by this action was injured. Seven years passed 
before he knew for sure that he had a child; a child who had never seen him nor 
had any opportunity to interact with him, creating substantial damage to any 
potential relationship. Having no knowledge of the obligation, he did not plan in 
any way to provide care for this unknown child during Ithat period but rather 
committed his resources and made his financial planning based upon those factors 
known and at hand. * 
1. In obligation founded upon a decree of divorce, a clearly defined legal obligation exists. The 
Defendant knows both the amount and the nature of the obligation, there is nothing uncertain in its 
scope. If based upon hearing nothing from the Plaintiff in such a case he decides to take no action, he 
places himself at some peril. In a case of a potential claim in paternity, the Defendant has much more 
limited rights with respect to the child and until some claim is asserted may not even know if he is the 
father of the child. Accordingly, there may be no duty or there may be a duty in an amount yet to be 
ascertained. 
Q 
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BL Estoppel. 
The doctrine of estoppel is also applicable in this matter. Estoppel differs 
from laches in that it is not just the lack of due diligence resulting in injury but "is 
a doctrine which precludes parties from asserting their rights where their actions 
or conduct render it inequitable to allow them to assert those rights." Hunter v. 
Hunter 669 P.2d 430, 432 (1983). 
Plaintiff has relied upon the case of Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147 
(1979) for the principle that "mere silence on the part of the Plaintiff is not 
sufficient to raise an estoppel". Id- at 148. This principle of course, is correct 
where there is no duty to speak. The finding in the instant case, of course, was not 
based upon mere silence but included specifically a finding that representations 
Plaintiff made to Mr. Snape were relayed to the Defendant and that he reasonably 
relied upon those communications. In Adams, the Court specifically found that 
there was no showing of a representation either "explicit" or "implicit" upon which 
the Defendant in that case relied. In fact, Adams knew that he had a duty 
of support, it had been established by decree. He claimed estoppel merely 
because Mrs. Adams had taken no action during a five and one-half year period to 
enforce her Court Ordered rights.. * Accordingly, in Adams there is no act, 
representation, or conduct that could be relied upon by the Defendant to support 
his claim of equitable estoppel and the Adams Court properly rejected estoppel. 
1. Adams did not raise and does not consider whether laches would have applied under the facts 
circumstances of that case. It is probable however, that the Defendant in Adams would have run 
afoul of the second principle of laches as the Court found that he had not "changed his position to his 
detriment" A dams v. Adam s, 593 P.2d at 148. 
n 
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There is no requirement at law that the act, representation or conduct be 
made in the presence of, or directly to the party relying upon it, merely that said 
act be done in a fashion reasonably likely to result in its communication to the 
third party and the resulting harm. 
In the instant case, the Plaintiff told Mr. Snape that she wanted no 
involvement with the Defendant, that she did not want him to participate in any 
fashion with the raising of the child. This in fact was her posture and position as 
stated during her own testimony, one which she did not change until the filing of 
the action. 1 
The second case relied upon by Plaintiffs is Hunter v. Hunter, 
supra. Hunter also examines a defense founded in estoppel and finds it wanting. 
In Hunter, the Plaintiff went into hiding with the child and concealed her 
whereabouts from the Defendant. The Defendant claimed that this was sufficient 
action to justify the application of the doctrine. He further stated that he had 
some misunderstandings partially derived from communications with his 
probation officer and the Department of Social Services that he would not be 
required to pay child support, id. at 432. It is significant in Hunter that the 
Court disregarded the communications Mr. Hunter had with his probation officer 
and the Department of Social Services because they did not "involve actions or 
1. As noted in her testimony, her motivation in bringing the action in June of 1983 was that she was 
then separated from her current husband and had a present desire for financial support for the child. 
This present and future desire was fully met. (TR. 16) The trial court found that as a result of the 
statements and acts communicated to Mr. Vrontikis by Mr. Snape, he directed his financial affairs and 
his life in reliance upon not having a financial obligation to the Plaintiff. And clearly as found by the 
trial court he would be injured if now forced to go back and borrow money to pay the Plaintiff for the 
period of time for which she had no desire to have financial assistance and for which he made no plan. 
m 
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conduct by the appellant". Id. at 432. The Court also found that the Plaintiffs 
actions in going into hiding were justified by her fear of the Defendant and on the 
basis of previous violent experiences with him. Id. at 433. Thus, a party may not 
rely upon the statements of third parties to support his claim for equitable 
estoppel unless he can show that those statements are based upon and related to 
acts, representations or conduct of the party against whom the estoppel will be 
applied. In the instant case it is the acts and representations of the Plaintiff which 
are communicated to the Defendant through Mr. Snape and upon which he relies 
to his detriment that the Trial Court relied upon to establish the factual basis for 
the application of the doctrine of estoppel. 
Implicit in the statements of the Plaintiff that she desired to be left alone 
and did not want any contact or involvement with the Defendant is the message 
that she is not looking to him for any assistance either as a father or financial 
supporter of the child in question. In Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895 
(1976) the Court found the Plaintiff communication to the Defendant that he was 
"to leave her and her family situation alone for the time being" sufficient conduct 
to serve as the basis for estoppel with respect to past obligations of support. Id. at 
896. The Defendant conformed his financial planning for these seven years to his 
understanding that he had no role and no obligation with respect to this child. To 
suddenly have to come up with four years of support payments that were never 
budgeted, planned for or known about presents a clear hardship much greater 
than would have an ongoing obligation. 
n 
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CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court was clearly within its discretion to determine that the delay 
of the Plaintiff, her actions reasonably led to a reliance by the Defendant to his 
detriment and in applying the equitable doctrines to this instant case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this $J day of September, 1988. 
^j^jT' '/Z^-n 
JEROME H.MOONEY 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
i^> 
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